Arbeitspapier
The efficiency of unfunded pension schemes
Public pension schemes can be designed either as capital reserve systems or as unfunded (or pay-as-you-go) schemes. In the literature it has been alleged that unfunded schemes are intergenerationally efficient in Pareto's sense. Here we show that this holds only if contributions to the system are levied as lump-sum taxes. But in reality, flat-rate income taxes are normally used instead - and then, an unfunded scheme induced distortions and can completely be abolished in finite time without inflicting damage upon any generation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 523
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Social Security and Public Pensions
- Subject
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Public Pensions
Overlapping Generations
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Homburg, Stefan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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Hannover
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.5000, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Homburg, Stefan
- Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2014