Arbeitspapier

The efficiency of unfunded pension schemes

Public pension schemes can be designed either as capital reserve systems or as unfunded (or pay-as-you-go) schemes. In the literature it has been alleged that unfunded schemes are intergenerationally efficient in Pareto's sense. Here we show that this holds only if contributions to the system are levied as lump-sum taxes. But in reality, flat-rate income taxes are normally used instead - and then, an unfunded scheme induced distortions and can completely be abolished in finite time without inflicting damage upon any generation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 523

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Social Security and Public Pensions
Subject
Public Pensions
Overlapping Generations

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Homburg, Stefan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
Hannover
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.5000, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Homburg, Stefan
  • Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2014

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