Arbeitspapier

Who goes first? Strategic delay and learning by waiting

This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 500

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wagner, Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.24764
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24764-2
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wagner, Peter
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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