Corporate governance versus economic governance: banks and industrial restructuring in the US and Germany

Arbeitspapier

This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS I 95-310

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Industrie ; Wirtschaftliche Anpassung ; Corporate Governance ; Staatliche Einflussnahme ; Institutionalismus ; Deutschland ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Vitols, Sigurt
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 1995

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44078
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ