Arbeitspapier

Corporate governance and dividend policy in Poland

This study examines the relation between corporate governance practices measured by Transparency Disclosure Index (TDI) and dividend policy in Poland. Our empirical approach, constructs measures of the quality of the corporate governance for 110 non-financial companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2004. We find evidence that an increase in the TDI or its subindices leads to an increase in the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio. These results support the hypothesis that companies with weak shareholder rights pay dividends less generously than do firms with high corporate governance standards. Therefore, minority shareholders often use power to extract dividends. We also find that large and more profitable companies have a higher dividend payout ratio, while riskier and more indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 702

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Payout Policy
Thema
corporate governance
dividend policy
agency theory
Corporate Governance
Dividende
Eigentümerstruktur
Agency Theory
Polen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kowalewski, Oskar
Stetsyuk, Ivan
Talavera, Oleksandr
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kowalewski, Oskar
  • Stetsyuk, Ivan
  • Talavera, Oleksandr
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)