Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers

Arbeitspapier

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome this socially inefficient situation. This model is estimated and tested with rich micro-data from court records. Employing a multiple treatment matching procedure we estimate the causal effect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property, on the length of the divorce process and on the quality of the divorce settlement.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0713

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Litigation Process ; Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse ; Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining ; Family and Personal Law ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: litigation ; lawyers ; divorce settlements ; dispute resolution ; family law ; multiple treatment matching ; Ehe ; Rechtsberatung ; Excess Burden ; Gefangenendilemma ; Österreich

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Halla, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
• (where): Linz
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73304
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET