Arbeitspapier

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more success. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper departs from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and strong free-riding. Instead, it considers that countries agree on modest emission reduction targets. This may sufficiently raise participation so that the success of treaties improves in terms of global emission reduction and global welfare. Thus, modesty may pay, though the first best optimum cannot be achieved.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 68.2004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Thema
International environmental agreements
Internal&external stability
Modest emission reduction
Umweltabkommen
Umweltstandard
Koalition
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Finus, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Finus, Michael
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2004

Ähnliche Objekte (12)