Arbeitspapier

Inviting Competition to Achieve Critical Mass

In this paper we analyze a network market in which it is beneficial for a producer to invite competitors to share a market, even when this is not needed in order to affect consumer beliefs. Because of the nature of such goods, the demand curve for network markets typically rises and then falls. If the marginal cost curve of the producer is also upwardly sloping, the firm may be either unable to profitably produce a sufficient quantity to satisfy demand at any price, or may be able to, but benefit more if there are other producers also. Interestingly, optimal behavior by the producer is independent of the type of competition that will exist between the firms after the competitors have entered the market. Because the firm controls the number of entrants, it can always guarantee that it will receive maximal profits given the demand function and its technology. Implications for antitrust legislation and for strategic behavior by the firm are discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
Network market
critical mass
network externalities

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Etziony, Amir
Weiss, Avi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Ramat-Gan
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Etziony, Amir
  • Weiss, Avi
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

Ähnliche Objekte (12)