Artikel

A policy for the size of individual unemployment accounts

Individual unemployment accounts (IUAs) attenuate the moral hazard attached to unemployment insurance. However, the available literature provides no policy recommendation about what percentage of the contributions should go to IUAs. We propose criteria of actuarial neutrality and use a simple job search model to argue that a sizable proportion of the contributions could go to IUAs without changing benefits and contribution rates, and therefore not negatively affecting well-being. We derive this result from a model, first, and then use simulations to show that it also holds in more realistic settings and different labor market dynamics.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: IZA Journal of Labor Policy ; ISSN: 2193-9004 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 9 ; Pages: 1-11 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
Social security
Unemployment insurance
Unemployment accounts
Moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Castro, Rubén
Weber, Michael
Reyes, Gonzalo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.1186/s40173-018-0102-z
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Castro, Rubén
  • Weber, Michael
  • Reyes, Gonzalo
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2018

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