Artikel
A policy for the size of individual unemployment accounts
Individual unemployment accounts (IUAs) attenuate the moral hazard attached to unemployment insurance. However, the available literature provides no policy recommendation about what percentage of the contributions should go to IUAs. We propose criteria of actuarial neutrality and use a simple job search model to argue that a sizable proportion of the contributions could go to IUAs without changing benefits and contribution rates, and therefore not negatively affecting well-being. We derive this result from a model, first, and then use simulations to show that it also holds in more realistic settings and different labor market dynamics.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: IZA Journal of Labor Policy ; ISSN: 2193-9004 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 9 ; Pages: 1-11 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
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Social security
Unemployment insurance
Unemployment accounts
Moral hazard
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Castro, Rubén
Weber, Michael
Reyes, Gonzalo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer
- (wo)
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Heidelberg
- (wann)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.1186/s40173-018-0102-z
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Castro, Rubén
- Weber, Michael
- Reyes, Gonzalo
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2018