Artikel

Multinational Financial Structure and Tax Competition

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational's affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. However, there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment if the debt externality is not negative.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics ; ISSN: 2235-6282 ; Volume: 149 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 381-404 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Publicly Provided Private Goods
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Thema
Multinational enterprises
financial policy
corporate taxation
tax competition

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wrede, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.1007/BF03399396
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Wrede, Matthias
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2013

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