Arbeitspapier
On the optimality of rivacy in sequential contracting
This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1404
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
contractual and informational externalities
mechanism design
optimal disclosure policies
sequential common agency games
exogenous and endogenous private information
Extensives Spiel
Vertragstheorie
Agency Theory
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Calzolari, Giacomo
Pavan, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Calzolari, Giacomo
- Pavan, Alessandro
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2005
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