Arbeitspapier

Developing rotten institutions

This paper models corruption as optimal parasitism in organizations where teams of agents are weakly restrained by principals. Each agent takes on part of the role of principal, choosing how much to invest in policing to repress corruption in others and how rapaciously to act when unpoliced opportunities arise. This simple model incorporates most of the factors stressed in empirical analyses of corruption, and gives rise to a wide variety of equilibria. Allow income to co-evolve with corruption, we show how adding corruption to a textbook exogenous growth model leads to a Lucas paradox. When income and corruption a ect each other su ciently strongly, economies converge to two corner equilibria despite diminishing returns to capital: a rich, clean corner and a poor, corrupt one; a pattern that appears to characterize international data.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP05/13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Korruption
Bürokratie
Bürokratietheorie
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kelly, Morgan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University College Dublin, Department of Economics
(wo)
Dublin
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kelly, Morgan
  • University College Dublin, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2005

Ähnliche Objekte (12)