Arbeitspapier

Foreign debt, capital controls, and secondary markets: Theory and evidence from Nazi Germany

We show how elite capture affects optimal debt repatriations and management of official reserves under capital controls, bridging literature on debt buybacks and secondary markets. The model we provide guides our study of one of history's largest debt repatriations -in 1930s Germany. Authorities kept private repatriations under strict control -avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects- while allowing discretionary repatriations so to reap internal political benefits. German assets exhibited large spreads between their domestic and foreign prices, granting arbitrage profits to those who had forex access. New data reveals that spread dynamics were affected by the impact of capital controls on secondary markets.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour" ; No. 25

Classification
Wirtschaft
Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: Europe: 1913-
Subject
Sovereign risk
Capital controls
Elite capture
Germany
Nazi regime
Foreign debt
Secondary markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Papadia, Andrea
Schioppa, Claudio A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University Berlin
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.18452/22060
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/22748-0
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Papadia, Andrea
  • Schioppa, Claudio A.
  • Humboldt University Berlin

Time of origin

  • 2020

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