Arbeitspapier

Source versus residence based taxation with international mergers and acquisitions

This paper analyses tax competition and tax coordination in a model where capital flows occur in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenfield investment. In this framework, we show that differences in residence based taxes do not necessarily distort international ownership patterns. Moreover, tax competition yields globally efficient levels of source based corporate income taxes if residence based taxes on capital income are absent. In contrast, in the presence of residence based taxes on dividends, source based corporate income taxes are inefficiently high. The widespread view that tax coordination is less urgent if residence based taxes are available may therefore be misguided.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2854

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
corporate taxation
tax competition
mergers and acquisitions
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Ursprungslandprinzip
Übernahme
Fusion
Internationale Kapitalmobilität
Steuerwettbewerb
Körperschaftsteuer
Steuerharmonisierung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Becker, Johannes
Fuest, Clemens
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Becker, Johannes
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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