Arbeitspapier

Capital market imperfections and the theory of optimum currency areas

This paper studies how capital market imperfections affect the welfare effects of forming a currency union. The analysis considers a bank-only world where intermediaries compete in Cournot fashion and monitoring and state verification are costly. The first part determines the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks, prior to joining the union. The second part discusses the benefits from joining a currency union. A competition effect is identified and related to the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country, through an argument akin to the Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model of bilateral trade. Whether joining a union raises welfare of the home country is shown to depend on the relative strength of investment creation and intermediation diversion effects.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 08-09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Finanzmarkt
Unvollkommener Markt
Währungsunion
Optimaler Währungsraum
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Agénor, Pierre-Richard
Aizenman, Joshua
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics (SCIIE)
(wo)
Santa Cruz, CA
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Agénor, Pierre-Richard
  • Aizenman, Joshua
  • University of California, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics (SCIIE)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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