Arbeitspapier

Reverse Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecroppers' Productivity

Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how strategic response of tenants - to varying economic and tenure security status of the landlords - is important in explaining productivity differentials of sharecroppers. The results show that sharecroppers yield are significantly lower on plots leased from landlords who are non-kin; female; with lower income generating opportunity; and tenure insecure households, than on plots leased from landlords with contrasting characteristics. While, on aggregate, the result shows no significant efficiency loss on kin-operated sharecropped plots, a more decomposed analyses indicate strong evidences of Marshallian inefficiency on kin-operated plots leased from landlords with weaker bargaining power and higher tenure insecurity. This study, thus, shows how failure to control for such heterogeneity of landowners' characteristics can explain the lack of clarity in the existing empirical literature on the extent of moral hazard problems in sharecropping contracts.

ISBN
978-82-7490-209-1
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Centre for Land Tenure Studies Working Paper ; No. 02/12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
Thema
Marshallian inefficiency
kinship
matching
Reverse-Share-Tenancy
Ethiopia

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ghebru, Hosaena H.
Holden, Stein T.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), Centre for Land Tenure Studies (CLTS)
(wo)
Ås
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ghebru, Hosaena H.
  • Holden, Stein T.
  • Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), Centre for Land Tenure Studies (CLTS)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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