Competing coalitions in international monetary policy games

Arbeitspapier

In Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union's discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearing that the insiders will try to do the same. In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions. The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose too much discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currency blocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policy coordination.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: HWWA Discussion Paper ; No. 258

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
• Thema: Currency unions ; international policy coordination ; Free-riding ; Coalition formation ; Geldpolitik ; Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination ; Koalition ; Währungsunion ; Währungsraum ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Institutioneller Wettbewerb ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kohler, Marion
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)
• (wo): Hamburg
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19230
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ