Arbeitspapier
Uncovered set choice rule
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalised in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that for each feasible (finite) choice situation, the choice coincides with the uncovered set of T. This notion of rationality explains not only cyclical and context dependent choices observed in practice, but also provides testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 563
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- Subject
-
Rationalizability, Uncovered set, Intransitive choice
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Abstimmungsregel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lombardi, Michele
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
London
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lombardi, Michele
- Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2006
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