Stock-related compensation and product-market competition

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers' short-run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock-related incentives may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 35.1999

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Business Objectives of the Firm
• Thema: CEO Compensation ; Delegation ; Collusion ; Oligopoly ; Managerial incentives ; Ownership and control ; Corporate governance

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 1999

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154989
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ