The Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An emperical analysis
Abstract: The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: European Union Politics ; 9 (2008) 3 ; 315-338
- Classification
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Politik
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2008
- Creator
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Warntjen, Andreas
- DOI
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10.1177/1465116508093487
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-229389
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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25.03.2025, 1:56 PM CET
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Warntjen, Andreas
Time of origin
- 2008