The Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An emperical analysis

Abstract: The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: European Union Politics ; 9 (2008) 3 ; 315-338

Classification
Politik

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2008
Creator
Warntjen, Andreas

DOI
10.1177/1465116508093487
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-229389
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
25.03.2025, 1:56 PM CET

Data provider

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Associated

  • Warntjen, Andreas

Time of origin

  • 2008

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