Arbeitspapier

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 83.2009

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Partition Function
Externalities
Implementation
Recursive Core
Stationary Perfect Equilibrium
Time Consistent Equilibrium

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kóczy, László Á.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kóczy, László Á.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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