Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation

Arbeitspapier

Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial part of their expected rent and prefer a strategy that ensures a lower but secure pay-off.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2017-202

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Expectations; Speculations
• Thema: all-pay auction ; contests ; heterogeneity ; superstars ; experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fehr, Dietmar ; Schmid, Julia
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157372
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ