Arbeitspapier | Working paper

The lifeboat problem

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (a seat). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria. (author's abstract)

Extent
Seite(n): 20
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism (SP II 2011-106)

Subject
Wirtschaft
Volkswirtschaftstheorie
Preis
Wettbewerb
Spiel
Gleichgewicht
Preisbildung
Spieltheorie
Wettkampf

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Konrad, Kai A.
Kovenock, Dan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
(where)
Deutschland, Berlin
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

  • 2011

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