Arbeitspapier | Working paper
The lifeboat problem
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (a seat). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria. (author's abstract)
- Extent
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Seite(n): 20
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism (SP II 2011-106)
- Subject
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Wirtschaft
Volkswirtschaftstheorie
Preis
Wettbewerb
Spiel
Gleichgewicht
Preisbildung
Spieltheorie
Wettkampf
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Konrad, Kai A.
Kovenock, Dan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (where)
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Deutschland, Berlin
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Kovenock, Dan
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2011
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