Arbeitspapier

Does Remuneration Affect the Discipline and the Selection of Politicians? Evidence from Pay Harmonization in the European Parliament

We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed information on individual MEPs between 2004 and 2011, we find that the reform, which comes with an exceptional increase of, on average, 200 percent per national delegation, has a positive incentive effect on in-office effort as approximated by engagement in speeches, written declarations and drafted reports. However, a higher remuneration increases absence. With respect to political selection, we find that a higher remuneration increases re-election rates. The composition of the pool of MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality approximated with formal education, previous political experience and occupational background is, however, unaffected. If we restrict our attention to freshmen, we find that a higher remuneration is related to a lower fraction of MEPs with previous political experience at the highest national level.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2013/03

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Subject
Politicas selection
remuneration of politicians
electoral system
European Parliament
Abgeordnete
Politikfinanzierung
Reform
Wahlsystem
EU-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Braendle, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61351
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Braendle, Thomas
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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