Arbeitspapier

Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial public offering

We analyze the desinvestment decision of venture capitalists in the course of an IPO of their portfolio firms. The capital market learns of the project quality only in the period following the IPO. Venture capitalists with high-quality firms face a trade-off between immediately selling their stake in the venture at a price below the true value and having to wait until the true value is revealed. We show that the dilemma may be resolved via a reputation-acquiring mechanism in a repeated game set-up. Thereby, we can explain, e.g., the advent of 'hot-issue market behavior' involving early disinvestments and a high degree of price uncertainty. Furthermore, we provide a new rationale for underpricing. Young venture capitalists may use underpricing as a device for credibly committing themselves to acquiring reputation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2002/07

Classification
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Exit Decisions
Venture Capital
IPO
Underpricing

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Neus, Werner
Walz, Uwe
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2002

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9972
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Neus, Werner
  • Walz, Uwe
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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