Arbeitspapier
Fairness ex ante & ex post: The benefits of renegotiation in media markets
The market for copyrights is characterised by a highly skewed distribution of profits: very few movies, books and songs generate huge profits, whereas the great bulk barely manages to recover production cost. At the moment when the owner of intellectual property grants a licence ('ex ante'), neither party knows the true value of the traded commodity. A seemingly odd norm from German copyright law, the so-called bestseller provision, stipulates that the seller of a licence has a legally enforceable right to a bonus in case the work ('ex post') turns out a blockbuster. We experimentally explore the effect of the provision on market prices, on the number of deals struck and on perceived fairness. Our results show that the provision leads to lower prices for copyrights. More copyrights trade. The buyers perceive less ex-post unfairness.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,29
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Contract Law
- Thema
-
experiment
fairness
Copyright
Uncertainty
Urheberrecht
Medienökonomik
Preis
Risiko
Lizenzvergabe
Provision
Gerechtigkeit
Test
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Engel, Christoph
Kurschilgen, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Engel, Christoph
- Kurschilgen, Michael
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The Law – An Impossible Discipline
Tax morale and fairness in conflict: An experiment
Learning the Law
Incentives for process innovation in a collusive duopoly
Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge to Constitutional Law
Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony
Judicial decision-making a survey of the experimental evidence
Corporate design for regulability: a principal-agent-supervisor model
The Internet and the Nation State
Rationale Rechtspolitik und ihre Grenzen
Intellectual property as a carrot for innovators: using game theory to show the limits of the argument
Medaille zur Eröffung der Ausstellung "Wettbewerb zur Künstlerförderung Grimms Märchen", mit Werbefaltblatt, im Plastfolder
The Law – An Impossible Discipline
Tax morale and fairness in conflict: An experiment
Learning the Law
Incentives for process innovation in a collusive duopoly
Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge to Constitutional Law
Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony
Judicial decision-making a survey of the experimental evidence
Corporate design for regulability: a principal-agent-supervisor model
The Internet and the Nation State
Rationale Rechtspolitik und ihre Grenzen
Intellectual property as a carrot for innovators: using game theory to show the limits of the argument
Medaille zur Eröffung der Ausstellung "Wettbewerb zur Künstlerförderung Grimms Märchen", mit Werbefaltblatt, im Plastfolder
The Law – An Impossible Discipline
Tax morale and fairness in conflict: An experiment
Learning the Law
Incentives for process innovation in a collusive duopoly
Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge to Constitutional Law
Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony
Judicial decision-making a survey of the experimental evidence
Corporate design for regulability: a principal-agent-supervisor model
The Internet and the Nation State
Rationale Rechtspolitik und ihre Grenzen
Intellectual property as a carrot for innovators: using game theory to show the limits of the argument