Bargaining, mergers, and technology choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of industry profits. We find that retailer mergers are more likely (less likely) if suppliers have increasing (decreasing) unit costs, while supplier mergers are more likely (less likely) if goods are substitutes (complements). In a second step we explore how market structure affects suppliers’ technology choice, which reflects a trade-off between inframarginal and marginal production costs. We find that suppliers focus more on marginal cost reduction if (i) retailers are integrated and (ii) suppliers are non-integrated. In a final step we consider the whole picture where both market structure and (subsequent) technology choice are endogenous. Analyzing the equilibrium market structure, we find cases where retailers become integrated to induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology, even though integration weakens their bargaining position. In this case the merger benefits all parties, i.e., suppliers, retailers, and even consumers. However, we also show that the equilibrium market structure does often not maximize welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-19

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: Bilateral Oligopoly ; Antitrust ; Bargaining Power ; Merger ; Retailing ; Technology Choice

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Inderst, Roman ; Wey, Christian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51044
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET