Arbeitspapier

Imperfect Information and the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis

Despite a strong theoretical prediction that income skewness and redistribution should be positively linked, empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. This paper argues that it is important to distinguish between sources of changes in income skewness. Two sources of such changes are discussed: rising polarization and upward mobility, which both increase income skewness. Under imperfect information, these developments affect redistribution in diff erent ways. While rising polarization increases redistribution, upward mobility can have the opposite eff ect. Reasonable degrees of informational imperfection are suffi cient to generate increasing income skewness and decreasing redistribution in the presence of upward mobility.

ISBN
978-3-86788-246-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 213

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
voting
redistribution
imperfect information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bredemeier, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
(where)
Essen
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bredemeier, Christian
  • Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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