Arbeitspapier

Too-many-to-fail and the design of bailout regimes

We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout policy cannot implement the firstbest, as bailouts cause herding by banks. However, a targeted bailout policy that assigns banks to separate bailout regimes eliminates herding and achieves the firstbest. When such a policy is not feasible, targeted bailouts can be implemented by decentralizing bailout decisions to independent regulators. Our results have various implications for the optimal allocation of regulatory powers, both at the international level and domestically.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 230

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
systemic risk
too-many-to-fail
optimal investment
bailouts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wagner, Wolf
Zeng, Jing
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
(wo)
Bonn and Cologne
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wagner, Wolf
  • Zeng, Jing
  • University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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