Arbeitspapier
Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?
In a standard partial equilibrium model of resource depletion, this paper charac- terizes and examines the solution to the optimal taxation problem when extraction is monopolistic. The main result is that the family of subgame perfect effciency- inducing tax/subsidy schemes may include some strict tax policies. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing effciency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 08/92
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: General
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
Exhaustible resources
Imperfect competition
Optimal taxation
Optimale Besteuerung
Monopolistischer Wettbewerb
Erschöpfbare Ressourcen
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Daubanes, Julien
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005666524
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Daubanes, Julien
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2008