Arbeitspapier

Choice democracy

Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-edged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: Choice Democracy. Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 38

Classification
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Crisis Management
Public Goods
Subject
democracy
choice
polyarchy
stability
competition
efficiency
Demokratie
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ledoit, Olivier
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-51542
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ledoit, Olivier
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2011

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