Arbeitspapier
Choice democracy
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-edged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: Choice Democracy. Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 38
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Crisis Management
Public Goods
- Subject
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democracy
choice
polyarchy
stability
competition
efficiency
Demokratie
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ledoit, Olivier
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-51542
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ledoit, Olivier
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011