Arbeitspapier
Choice democracy
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-edged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: Choice Democracy. Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 38
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Crisis Management
Public Goods
- Thema
-
democracy
choice
polyarchy
stability
competition
efficiency
Demokratie
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ledoit, Olivier
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-51542
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ledoit, Olivier
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011