The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus bundling

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism de- sign and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private informa- tion about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and par- ticipation constraints, the …nal allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satis…es a condition of renegoti- ation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2006,21

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Public Goods ; Publicly Provided Private Goods
• Subject: Mechanism Design ; Excludable Public Goods ; Ramsey- Boiteux Pricing ; Renegotiation Proofness ; Bundling ; Öffentliches Gut ; Gebühr ; Ramsey-Preis ; Price Bundling ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hellwig, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26905
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET