Arbeitspapier
A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games
This paper proposes an interpretation of the experimental evidence on tacit coordination games involving randomly matched players provided by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), based on the notion of stochastic stability. When the model is calibrated with the parameters chosen in the experiment, it predicts that every strict Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable; therefore, in the long run we should not observe the emergence of any particular pattern of behavior, as suggested by the experimental evidence. The model is also compatible with the experimental evidence provided by Goeree and Holt (2005).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 627
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bagnoli, Lidia
Negroni, Giorgio
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4623
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bagnoli, Lidia
- Negroni, Giorgio
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2008
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