Arbeitspapier

Accidental bequests: A curse for the rich and a boon for the poor

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3094

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Subject
accidental bequests
estate tax
tagging
first best
second best
Grundsteuer
Erbschaftsteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Erbe
Verteilungswirkung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cremer, Helmuth
Gahvari, Firouz
Pestieau, Pierre
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • Gahvari, Firouz
  • Pestieau, Pierre
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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