Arbeitspapier
Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes
We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 925
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
Institutional design
Award rule
Conflict of interest
Impartiality
Plurality correspondence
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Tamura, Shohei
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
-
Osaka
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Tamura, Shohei
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2015
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