Arbeitspapier
Can the private sector ensure the public interest? Evidence from federal procurement
We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance companies whose money is at stake through the so-called performance bonding. By focusing on the U.S. federal service contracts in the period 2005-2015, we exploit an exogenous variation in the threshold for the application of both sources of oversight in order to separately estimate their causal e effects on execution costs and time. We find that: (i) private oversight has a positive effect on outcomes through the screening of bidders that alters the pool of winning firms; (ii) public oversight negatively affects outcomes, due to excessive red tape induced by low-competence buyers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 18-045
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Construction
- Thema
-
oversight
procurement
screening
red tape
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
Rovigatti, Gabriele
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
- Rovigatti, Gabriele
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2018