Arbeitspapier

Can the private sector ensure the public interest? Evidence from federal procurement

We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance companies whose money is at stake through the so-called performance bonding. By focusing on the U.S. federal service contracts in the period 2005-2015, we exploit an exogenous variation in the threshold for the application of both sources of oversight in order to separately estimate their causal e effects on execution costs and time. We find that: (i) private oversight has a positive effect on outcomes through the screening of bidders that alters the pool of winning firms; (ii) public oversight negatively affects outcomes, due to excessive red tape induced by low-competence buyers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 18-045

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Construction
Thema
oversight
procurement
screening
red tape
moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
Rovigatti, Gabriele
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
  • Rovigatti, Gabriele
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2018

Ähnliche Objekte (12)