Arbeitspapier

A Schumpeterian Model of Protection and Relative Wages

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of trade between two advanced countries in which both innovation and skilled acquisition rates are endogenously determined. The model offers a North-North (as opposed to a North-South) trade explanation for increasing relative wage inequality. A global reduction in trade barriers increases R&D investment and accelerates the pace of technological progress. It also reduces the relative wage of unskilled workers and results in skill upgrading, if and only if R&D is the skill-intensive activity relative to manufacturing of final products. Trade liberalization does not affect domestic relative prices in either of the two countries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 471

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
Trade: General
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Thema
Economic growth
R&D
Protection
Relative Wages
Außenwirtschaftstheorie
Lohn
Humankapital
Innovation
Technischer Fortschritt
Handelsliberalisierung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dinopoulos, Elias
Segerstrom, Paul
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
1996

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dinopoulos, Elias
  • Segerstrom, Paul
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 1996

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