Arbeitspapier

Explaining the harmonic sequence paradox

According to the harmonic sequence paradox (Blavatskyy 2006), an expected utility decision maker's willingness-to-pay for a gamble whose expected payoffs evolve according to the harmonic series is finite if and only if his marginal utility of additional income becomes zero for rather low payoff levels. Since the assumption of zero marginal utility is implausible for finite payoffs levels, expected utility theory - as well as its standard generalizations such as cumulative prospect theory - are apparently unable to explain a finite willingness-to-pay. The present paper presents first an experimental study of the harmonic sequence paradox. Additionally, it demonstrates that the theoretical argument of the harmonic sequence paradox only applies to time-patient decision makers whereas the paradox is easily avoided if time-impatience is introduced.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1724

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
St. Petersburg Paradox
Expected Utility
Time-Preferences
Willingness to pay
Erwartungsnutzen
Zeitpräferenz
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schmidt, Ulrich
Zimper, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schmidt, Ulrich
  • Zimper, Alexander
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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