Arbeitspapier

Explaining the harmonic sequence paradox

According to the harmonic sequence paradox (Blavatskyy 2006), an expected utility decision maker's willingness-to-pay for a gamble whose expected payoffs evolve according to the harmonic series is finite if and only if his marginal utility of additional income becomes zero for rather low payoff levels. Since the assumption of zero marginal utility is implausible for finite payoffs levels, expected utility theory - as well as its standard generalizations such as cumulative prospect theory - are apparently unable to explain a finite willingness-to-pay. The present paper presents first an experimental study of the harmonic sequence paradox. Additionally, it demonstrates that the theoretical argument of the harmonic sequence paradox only applies to time-patient decision makers whereas the paradox is easily avoided if time-impatience is introduced.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1724

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subject
St. Petersburg Paradox
Expected Utility
Time-Preferences
Willingness to pay
Erwartungsnutzen
Zeitpräferenz
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmidt, Ulrich
Zimper, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmidt, Ulrich
  • Zimper, Alexander
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2011

Other Objects (12)