Artikel

On asymmetric reserve prices

We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some bidders channels benefits toward marginal agents in the favored group and does not adversely impact nonfavored bidders whose reserve price is unchanged. Even in symmetric environments, when the valuation distribution is not regular, introducing asymmetric reserve prices can increase the auctioneer's revenue compared to an optimal common reserve price. Implications for auction design are considered.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 205-237 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Subject
First-price auction
asymmetric auctions
reserve price
mechanism design
affirmative action
procurement

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kotowski, Maciej H.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1824
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kotowski, Maciej H.
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2018

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