Interactive Unawareness and Speculative Trade

Arbeitspapier

The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, 1998). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the literature. In an example of speculative trade, we demonstrate how mutual unawareness of fundamentals allows for common knowledge of willingness to trade together with strict preference for trade. Such a state of affairs is impossible to model in standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: unawareness ; awareness ; knowledge ; interactive epistemology ; speculative trade ; bounded perception ; Erkenntnistheorie ; Wahrnehmung ; Wissen ; Information ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22866
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET