Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade

Arbeitspapier

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-speculative-trade theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagree theorem. Finally, we show the existence of a universal unawareness belief type space.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 11-8

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: unawareness ; awareness ; common prior ; agreement ; speculative trade ; universal type-space ; interactive epistemology ; inattention

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of California, Department of Economics
• (wo): Davis, CA
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58387
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ