Incentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users

Arbeitspapier

In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent's payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non- egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer (but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1316

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises ; Public Sector Labor Markets ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
• Thema: incentives ; anonymity principle ; egalitarian tasks allocation ; principal agent user relationship ; crowding-out effect ; Öffentliche Dienstleistung ; Dienstleistungsqualität ; Leistungsorientierte Vergütung ; Agency Theory ; Crowding out ; Verbraucher ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie ; Pencil-Pusher Game

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Crifo, Patricia ; Rullière, Jean-Louis
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ