Hierarchy, opportunism in teams

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.

Object Details

• Extent: Seite(n): 39-50
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69(1)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Wirtschaft ; Psychologie ; Sozialpsychologie ; Management ; Experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heijden, Eline van der ; Potters, Jan ; Sefton, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Niederlande
• (when): 2008

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST