Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Hierarchy, opportunism in teams
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 39-50
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69(1)
- Thema
-
Wirtschaft
Psychologie
Sozialpsychologie
Management
Experiment
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Heijden, Eline van der
Potters, Jan
Sefton, Martin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Niederlande
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Heijden, Eline van der
- Potters, Jan
- Sefton, Martin
Entstanden
- 2008