Arbeitspapier

Growth Forecasts, Belief Manipulation and Capital Markets

We analyze how a benevolent, privately-informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy's growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs. We model two types of agents: "trusting" and "distrustful." The former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency, whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency. We identify both "revealing" and "nonrevealing" equilibria and demonstrate that the "nonrevealing" equilibria can dominate the "revealing" equilibria in terms of ex-post social welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010:8

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Thema
Social welfare
information
forecasting
asset pricing
heterogeneous beliefs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lundtofte, Frederik
Leoni, Patrick
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lundtofte, Frederik
  • Leoni, Patrick
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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