Arbeitspapier
Growth Forecasts, Belief Manipulation and Capital Markets
We analyze how a benevolent, privately-informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy's growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs. We model two types of agents: "trusting" and "distrustful." The former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency, whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency. We identify both "revealing" and "nonrevealing" equilibria and demonstrate that the "nonrevealing" equilibria can dominate the "revealing" equilibria in terms of ex-post social welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010:8
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- Thema
-
Social welfare
information
forecasting
asset pricing
heterogeneous beliefs
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lundtofte, Frederik
Leoni, Patrick
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lundtofte, Frederik
- Leoni, Patrick
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012