Arbeitspapier

General Revealed Preference Tests of Weak Separability and Utility Maximization with Incomplete Adjustment

Boards hire and fire CEOs based on imperfect information. Using comprehensive data on 28 cohorts in Sweden, we analyze the role of a potentially important unobserved attribute - CEO health - in corporate governance. We find CEOs are significantly healthier than the population and other highskill professionals, in particular in mental health. Health at appointment predicts turnover, suggesting boards respond to health problems and correct mismatches that occurred at the time of appointment. Health-related corporate governance appears to work imperfectly, however, as we find CEO health also associates with firm policies requiring an active CEO role.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1327

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Household Behavior: General
Money and Interest Rates: General
Thema
Aggregation
Incomplete Adjustment
Revealed Preference
Weak Separability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hjertstrand, Per
Swofford, James L.
Whitney, Gerald A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hjertstrand, Per
  • Swofford, James L.
  • Whitney, Gerald A.
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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