Corporate rent-seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint: An incremental cash flow approach to some corporate governance issues

Arbeitspapier

This paper seeks to expand on two topical strands in Government Finance and Political Science literature, rent-seeking and the soft-budget constraint, so as to bring forth a strong linkage with corporate governance environments. It will attempt to accomplish this task by setting up a distinctive framework of analysis that hinges on incremental cash flows. Firstly, it claims that both rent-seeking behavior and the soft-budget constraint are worthy of being applied to corporate governance learning and practice. Secondly, the paper contributes to focus on cash-flows reliability and managers' accountability. Thirdly, it is shown how conflicts of interest underlie rent-seeking behavior, and how the latter relates to the soft-budget constraint.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 283

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Rent-Seeking ; Soft-Budget Constraint ; Corporate Governance ; Incremental Cash Flow model ; Conflicts of Interest ; Unternehmensfinanzierung ; Rent-Seeking ; Budgetrestriktion

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Apreda, Rodolfo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
• (where): Buenos Aires
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84404
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET