Arbeitspapier
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold. With more provision levels for the public good more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants' willingness to pay. The paper thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2015/11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Welfare Economics: General
- Subject
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mechanism design
public-good provision
voting mechanisms
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bierbrauer, Felix
Hellwig, Martin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Hellwig, Martin
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2015
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