Polynomial sharings on two secrets: Buy one, get one free

Abstract: While passive side-channel attacks and active fault attacks have been studied intensively in the last few decades, strong attackers combining these attacks have only been studied relatively recently. Due to its simplicity, most countermeasures against passive attacks are based on additive sharing. Unfortunately, extending these countermeasures against faults often leads to quite a significant performance penalty, either due to the use of expensive cryptographic operations or a large number of shares due to massive duplication. Just recently, Berndt, Eisenbarth, Gourjon, Faust, Orlt, and Seker thus proposed to use polynomial sharing against combined attackers (CRYPTO 2023). While they construct gadgets secure against combined attackers using only a linear number of shares, the overhead introduced might still be too large for practical scenarios. In this work, we show how the overhead of nearly all known constructions using polynomial sharing can be reduced by nearly half by embeddin.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11691

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• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Polynomial sharings on two secrets: Buy one, get one free ; volume:2024 ; number:3 ; year:2024 ; IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 3 (2024)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Arnold, Paula ; Berndt, Sebastian ; Eisenbarth, Thomas ; Orlt, Maximilian

Further information

• DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.671-706
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407241854196.310984235152
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.