Property Rights to the World's (Linear) Ocean Fisheries in Customary International Law

Arbeitspapier

I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame, and show how the Exclusive Economic Zone emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and offshore fisheries, enclosure is inefficient, and customary law supports a more efficient "free sea" regime. The model also identifies the trigger for changes in property rights and the reason choice of a particular limit, like the current 200-mile zone, is arbitrary. In an asymmetric, regional sea, I find that the scope of the EEZ is determined by the relative power of coastal and distant water states, and need not be efficient. Finally, I find that proposals to nationalize the seas or ban fishing on the high seas are neither efficient nor supportable as equilibria in customary law.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10567

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Law ; International Institutional Arrangements ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture
• Subject: customary international law ; exclusive economic zone ; ocean fisheries ; closure of high seas

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Barrett, Scott
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2023

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/279318
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET