Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach

Artikel

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 607-635 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Bayesian persuasion ; information design ; information disclosure ; informed receiver

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kolotilin, Anton
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1805
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197158
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ